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Although the court's decision in Johnson 
is in line with the majority of other state 
holdings, it is at odds with the slowly de-
veloping current trend. In fact, on May 31, 
1985, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that §44 of the Act allows an employee 
to hold his employer's insurer liable under 
the theory of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress resulting from the actions of 
the insurer. Young v. Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity, 303 Md. 182, 492 A.2d 1270 
(1985); see also Gallagher v. Bituminous 
Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 303 
Md. 201,492 A.2d 1280 (1985). Johnson 
seems to put an end to any further expand-
ing of the exclusive remedy exceptions un-
der the Act. In Maryland, as in the major-
ity of jurisdictions, without a showing of 
a "deliberate intention" to injure an em-
ployee, an employer will not be held liable 
outside of the Act, no matter how grossly 
negligent he might be. The end result in 
Johnson was that Rodney Adams' estate, 
because Rodney had no dependents, could 
only recover medical and funeral expenses. 
-Stephen A. Markey, III 
u.s. V. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft: 
COURT UPHOLDS THIRD PARTY 
FORFEITURE UNDER 21 U.S.C. 
§881 
In U.S. v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft, 777 
F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1985), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit fol-
lowed precedents from the Second, Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits to hold that the use 
of an airplane to transport conspirators to 
the scene of a drug deal exposes that vehicle 
to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. §881 (1982). 
The court further held that an airplane 
owned by an uninvolved third party was 
subject to forfeiture because of his "con-
scious indifference." !d. at 952. 
In early 1983, an informant in Greenville, 
South Carolina contacted the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (DEA) about a possible co-
caine sale. The informant was directed to 
negotiate a buy and a DEA surveillance op-
eration began. The informant arranged a 
deal with Brown and Montgomery to buy 
ten kilograms of cocaine for $500,000. In 
late February, Montgomery flew to Ft. 
Lauderdale, Florida to meet with Gerant 
and Butler, the cocaine suppliers, and 
Coddington, a middleman, to negotiate the 
purcnase. After weighing the cocaine and 
checking its purity, Montgomery flew back 
to Greenville. 
Gerant and Coddington then flew a 1966 
Beechcraft from Ft. Lauderdale to South 
Carolina. There was circumstantial evi-
dence suggesting that the Beechcraft car-
ried the ten kilograms of cocaine. Butler 
flew a 1969 Aerostar from Ft. Lauderdale 
to South Carolina with a passenger, Hanna. 
All parties involved in the deal met at a 
Howard Johnson's and eventually all were 
. arrested, with the exception of Coddington, 
who escaped. In addition to recovering the 
cocaine from an automobile, a search of 
the hotel rooms revealed an electric money 
counter, a microscope, several guns, $4,960 
in cash and a marijuana cigarette. A search 
of the Beechcraft revealed documents in-
dicating that Gerant and Butler were on 
the plane in the Bahamas three months 
earlier. 
Under authority granted by 21 U.S.C. 
§ 881 (b)( 4), law enforcement officers seized 
the two airplanes once it was determined 
they were used to promote the drug trans-
action. Forfeiture proceedings against To-
tal Time Aircraft, Inc., the owner of the 
Beechcraft, and Sundance Air, Inc., the 
owner of the Aerostar, were instituted in 
federal district court. The consolidated 
cases were tried without a jury and the dis-
trict court ruled both aircraft were subject 
to forfeiture. Sundance Air is a Florida 
corporation wholly owned by Gerant. The 
district court determined that by trans-
porting two drug conspirators, Gerant was 
utilizing the corporation's plane to assist in 
the illegal act of selling cocaine. Therefore, 
the Aerostar was used to "facilitate the 
sale, transportation, possession or conceal-
ment of cocaine" which the corporation 
was aware of through its owner and was 
subject to forfeiture. Id. at 949. 
Total Time, is also a Florida corporation 
owned by David and Virgil Seeright. Total 
Time allowed Gerant touse the Beechcraft 
on several occasions, including the trip to 
South Carolina. The district court found 
that the Beechcraft transported the cocaine 
on this particular trip, concluding that it 
was used to further the "sale, transporta-
tion, possession or concealment" of cocaine 
in violation of21 U.S.c. §881(a)(4). It fur-
ther found that David Seeright, the corpo-
ration's president, did not inquire into the 
"purpose of the trip, or what cargo would 
be carried, required no signed contract, 
had no clear understanding as to when the 
plane would be returned, and received no 
money for its use." Id. at 950. In addition, 
a flight plan was not filed and there was no 
insurance on the plane. The district court 
concluded that Total Time did nothing to 
guard against the illegal use of its plane, 
and therefore, was not an "innocent owner" 
within the meaning of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Calero- Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
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Leasing, Inc., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). The 
court then ordered the forfeiture of the 
Beechcraft to the United States. 
Both Total Time and Sundance appealed 
the forfeirure by protesting that they were 
improperly denied a jury trial, that air-
planes do not constitute forfeirure propeny 
and that there was insufficient evidence to 
allow the forfeiture. 
The court of appeals concluded that To-
tal Time and Sundance, despite making 
timely requests for a trial by jury in their 
answers to the complaint, waived this right 
by failing to object to the district court's 
decision to try the case without a jury. Both 
defendants "vigorously participated" in the 
trial without mentioning their earlier re-
quest for a jury uial. Id. at 951. The court 
relied on its ruling in Milner tI. Norfolk & 
WeslernRailwayCo., 643F.2d 1005(1981), 
which, according to the court, stood for the 
proposition that basic equitable principles 
did not "mandate a jury trial if the plaintiff 
was on notice that the uial court was plan-
ning to adjudicate the dispositive issues of 
fact in the case and did not object." U.s. tI. 
1966 Beechcrafc, 777 F.2d at 951, citing 
Miller, 643 F.2d at 10 11, n.l. Since Total 
Time and Sundance were aware of the 
court's plan, to allow the defendants to re-
quest a jury and then "ambush the trial 
judge" on appeal would be unfair. 777 F.2d 
at 951, citing Palmer v. United States, 652 
F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1981). 
Total Time next asserted that as an "in-
nocent owner" it was exempt from the 
"broad sweep" of the forfeiture statutes. 
In Calero, the Supreme Court determined 
that an owner would not be subject to the 
forfeirure statutes wbere it was shown the 
owner was "not only uninvolved in and 
unaware of any wrongful activity, but that 
he had done all that could reasonably be 
expected to prevent the proscribed use of 
his property." 777 F.2d at 951. Seeright's 
behavior in the ca e at bar was determined 
to be unbusinesslike as well as unwise, par-
ticularly in an area "such as outh Florida 
where drug trafficking through the use of 
private aircraft flouri hes." The "conscious 
indifference" on the part of eeright estab-
lished that Total Time failed to do "all that 
it reasonably could to avoid having it prop-
erty put to unlawful u e." 777 F.2d at 952. 
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded 
that the district court did not err in deter-
mining that Total Time wa not an inno-
cent owner. 
The £inal argument on appeal involved 
the sufficiency of evidence produced at the 
uial by the government to support the for-
feiture order. Based on the te timony of 
Montgomery that the Beecbcraft carried co-
conspirators Gerant and Coddington, as 
26-The Law Forum/Spring, /986 
well as the cocaine, the court upheld the for-
feiture of the Beechcraft. The Government 
argued that the Aerostar, while not involved 
in carrying cocaine, facilitated the drug 
conspiracy by transporting two of the con-
spirator to the site of the deal and, there-
fore, it was forfeitable under the tatute. 
The circuits are divided over whether 
21 U.S.C. S881(aX4}, which subjects to 
forfeiture "all conveyances, including air-
craft, vehicles, or ves els to transport, or in 
any manner to facilitate the transportation, 
sale, receipt, possession or concealment" of 
controlled substances, may reach aircraft 
only carrying the con pirators to the trans-
action site. The First, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits have held that §881(aX4) Jays 
down a per se forfeiture of certain items of 
contraband but not of vehicle used in the 
mere transportation of suspected conspir-
ators. However, the Second, Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits have resolved that for-
feiture is proper when a vehicle only trans-
ports the drug dealer to the exchange site. 
In aligning it elf with the laner view-
point, the court looked (0 the legislative 
history of the statute, which directed that 
the intent of the provision was to allow for-
feiture of property "only if there is a sub-
stantial connection between the property 
and the underlying criminal activity." 777 
F.2d at 952. The Fourth Circuit concluded 
that transporting conspirators to an ex-
change site establishes a C sub (anrial con-
nection between the conveyance and the 
criminal activity sufficient to justify an or-
der of forfeiture." 777 F.2d at 953. It was 
further noted that the private airplane has 
become an important tool to drug traffick-
ers, particularly by allowing for quick ar-
rivals and departures, and makes their ap-
prehension all the more difficult. 
The court's decision regarding the waiver 
of a jury trial shows a total di regard for 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 
38(d) states that after a proper request for a 
trial by jury has been made, all the parties 
involved must con ent before it can be with-
drawn. Furthermore, Rule 39(aXl) stipu-
lates that a withdrawal must be in writing or 
by verbal consent in open court and entered 
in the record. Some court hold that these 
rules are to be held in strict compliance and 
any waiver cannot occur unless within the 
precise terms of the rules. Palmer, 652 F.2d 
at 896. While some court hold that the e 
rule are not to be tTictIy construed, see 
e.g., Bass 'V. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 209 
(5th Cir. 1949) cere. denied, 388 U.S. 816 
(1949), these courts, including the Fourth 
Circuit, seem to be ignoring the spirit of 
the rules. A right to a jury trial "occupies 
so firm a place in our history and jurispru-
dence that any seeming curtailment of the 
right to jury trial should be scrutinized 
with (he utmost care." Dimick v. Schiedt, 
293 U.S. 474, 485 (1934). 
How far the Fourth Circuit is willing to 
go to enforce 28 U.S.C. §881 remains to 
be seen. For now, owners of private vehi-
cles need to establish step [0 ensure their 
property is not being used for illegal pur-
poses or else risk being subject to forfeiture. 
A lack of knowledge of the criminal activ-
ity is not sufficient under this recent de-
cision. In addition, allowing ones property 
to be used only by the conspirators of 
crimes clearly jeopardizes that property. 
- Patricia A. Grace 
Trimper 'V. Porter-Hayden: 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
IN ASBESTO -RELATED 
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS 
In an attempt to deal with the unique 
character of asbesto -related deaths and its 
effect on wrongful death and urvival ac-
tions, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
Trimper tI. PortfJr-Haydm, 305 Md. 31, 
501 A.2d 446 (1985), held that wrongful 
death actions for a be tos-related deaths 
accrue either upon the discovery of me link 
between death and exposure to asbestos or 
upon the date of death whichever occurs 
first. 
In Trimper two widows, Charlotte M. 
Trimper and Sylvia Sandberg, rued sepa-
rate actions under the survival statutes for 
the wrongful deaths of their respective 
husbands alleging that the deaths of their 
husbands resulted from their exposure to 
asbesto and a best os dust. Both women 
ftled their claim within three years from 
the discovery of the connection between 
asbestos exposure and the deaths of tbeir 
husbands. The Circuit Court for Baltimore 
City dismissed both actions finding that 
the claims were time barred and each 
widow appealed to the court of special ap-
peals where the cases were consolidated. 
Writ of Certiorari was i sued by the court 
of appeals before the court of pedal ap-
peals had the opportunity to consider the 
matter. The que lion before the court was 
whether wrongful death and survival ac-
tions for asbe to -related deaths are time 
barred when instituted more than three 
years after death or whether a discovery 
rule applies. The court considered the 
wrongful death claims apart from the sur-
vival claims a they are dealt with in sepa-
rate statutes. 
MD. CTS & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§3-904(g) (1984) deals with wrongful death 
and provides that an action for wrongful 
